Rambouillet Agreement

58. The question of the referendum is less clear. A number of commentators claimed that the Rambouillet agreement had offered Kosovo Albanians a referendum on autonomy. Canada`s former ambassador to Yugoslavia told the Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade of the House of Commons of Canada: « It is now generally accepted by those who saw the Rambouillet agreement that no sovereign state could have accepted its terms. That`s right. Calls for a referendum on autonomy to be held within three years, guaranteeing a Serbian rejection. [117] William Hopkinson felt that a referendum on Milosevic`s independence could not have been accepted. [118] 50. The number of refugees and displaced persons continued to rise to 300,000 in September 1998, resulting in military threats,[103] and the Holbrooke Agreement. Within this deadline, the Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM) would be set up to complement Kdom under the control of the OSCE Permanent Council, « but in accordance with a Security Council resolution. In this way, Russia`s presence in the Security Council would allow Yugoslavia to ensure a minimum of indirect control of the operation. [104] The agreement provided for 2,000 unarmed observers, with the possibility of deploying additional personnel to « monitor » the elections.

NATO would also carry out air checks. The revision would address both the KLA and the monitoring of Milosevic`s military commitments. A NATO « extraction force » was also deployed to Macedonia, whose explicit mission was to ensure that the MTC could be saved in the event of a collapse in Kosovo, and whose tacit task was to increase military pressure on Milosevic. The Holbrooke agreement did not provide for a comprehensive solution, but a reduction in the intensity of the conflict, in the hope that this would lead to further measures. After Rambouillet`s failure, events unfolded quickly. OSCE international observers were withdrawn on 22 March out of fear for the safety of observers in the face of the expected NATO bombing. On 23 March, the Serbian Assembly issued a resolution condemning the withdrawal of OSCE observers[5] and accepting the principle of « autonomy » for Kosovo[6] and the non-military part of the agreement. 69. From a Russian perspective, Dr.

Levitin asserts that « the collapse of Rambouillet has nothing to do with the quality of Hill`s political projects: they have offered a realistic compromise and an applicable interim solution. [140] Professor Roberts told us that « on the main text of the agreement… It was not unreasonable. [141] Of course, the central question is whether Milosevic could have accepted the agreement. In addition to the incentives offered to Milosevic, the Minister of Foreign Affairs told us: « The Rambouillet peace process… a meeting with a remarkable over-generous representation for the Serbian population, and if the Serbian side had accepted Rambouillet, they would now be in a much better position. [142] Jonathan Steele`s view was that Rambouillet was « well judged if Milosevic had been a normal politician, but he is not a war criminal. » [143] After this line and it is a variation of that we have heard from many sourcesMilosevic was not vulnerable to the threats that his country is being bombed because he did not care for his people, or at least he took care of maintaining his own position more, and Rambouillet`s approval would be more dangerous to his position than launching a NATO bombing. 67. Whether or not a negotiated solution is expected, NATO needed the Kosovo Albanians to sign the agreement. This is mainly due to the fact that otherwise there was no hope of a negotiated solution which, from NATO`s point of view, would be an optimal outcome. But it is also because it would be difficult to justify the use of violence against him if Milosevic could not be held responsible for the collapse of the talks and, without the launch of a military campaign, attacks against the Kosovo Albanians could continue unimpeded.